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ESSAY 
THE LAW OF DECEPTION 
Amit Pundik 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 19, 2010, the District Court of Jerusalem convicted Sabbar Kashur of 
rape.
1
  According to the revised indictment, Kashur, a married Arab man, presented 
himself to the complainant, whom he met by chance for the first time in downtown 
Jerusalem, as a Jewish bachelor interested in a significant, romantic relationship.  
Following a short conversation, he proposed that she accompany him to a nearby 
building, on the roof of which they engaged in consensual intercourse.  Consent, 
however, was obtained by deception with respect to the perpetrator’s identity, and 
Kashur was convicted in accordance with a plea bargain.
2
  The case was covered in 
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 1 CrimC (Jer) 561/08 State of Israel v. Sabbar Kashur, PM 1996(123) (2010) (Isr.); see also 
Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 345(a)(2) (Isr.).  After an appeal was submitted to the Supreme Court, 
Kashur’s prison sentence was reduced from eighteen to nine months.  The defense raised arguments 
against the application of the offense of rape by deception, but the Court refused to address them 
on the merits because the defense only appealed against the sentence and did not seek to withdraw 
from the plea bargain.  CrimA 5734/10 Sabbar Kashur v. State of Israel 1474(1) PD para. 18 (2012) 
(Isr.) (Judge Meltzer’s sentence). 
 2 The facts above were those specified in the plea bargain and in the Court’s verdict.  
However, the testimony given by the complainant, as well as the facts appearing in the original 
indictment, were different and included allegations of coercive intercourse.  The discussion herein 
focuses on the alleged facts establishing the accused’s conviction and ignores the problematic 
decision by the prosecution to submit a plea bargain that contains a significant modification of the 
complaint, as well as the Court’s puzzling acceptance of this arrangement. 
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many newspaper columns by Israeli journalists and legal experts,
3
 and even received 
substantial exposure in the world press
4
 due to the allegedly racist aspect of the case.
5
 
Kashur has brought to a climax a trend that has become increasingly prominent 
in Israeli law, namely that of broadening the offense of rape by deception and 
preferring conviction for this offense over other possible offenses.  At first, such 
offenders were convicted of the nonsexual offense of obtainment by deception.
6
  In 
Ben Avraham, for example, the accused was convicted of obtainment by deception 
because he falsely presented himself as an ex-pilot, a successful doctor, and a rich 
proprietor from a posh village in Central Israel.
7
  Notably, this is the same offense 
that would have been charged had the accused deceived the victim to obtain financial 
benefit.  However, five years after Ben Avraham, the defendant in a case of deception 
was convicted of the offense of rape itself.  In Alkoby, the court convicted a 
transgender person born with female genitalia who presented himself as a man 
named Koby, of, among other offenses, indecent acts in circumstances of rape by 
deception and of several counts of attempted rape by deception.
8
  In a later case, the 
Court even ruled that conviction for obtainment by deception is unsuitable for cases 
of deceptive sexual relations, as it transforms sexual relations into an object, such 
 
 3 See, e.g., Orit Kamir, Harsha’at Ha’Aravi Be’ones Mehayevet Ri’anun Hukati [The Arab’s 
Conviction of Rape Mandates Constitutional Reform], YNET OPINIONS (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3923816,00.html; Ze’ev Segal, The Degradation of Rape, 
HAARETZ (July 21, 2010), https://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/article-print-page/1.1213045.   
 4 See, e.g., Jo Adetunji & Harriet Sherwood, Arab Guilty of Rape After Consensual Sex with 
Jew, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/21/arab-guilty-rape-
consensual-sex-jew; Dina Newman, Unravelling the Israeli Arab ‘Rape by Deception’ Case, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11329429 . 
 5 The case’s racial aspects, emphasized in the headlines, are in fact only mentioned once in 
the court’s decision, in conjunction with other aspects of the accused’s dishonest conduct towards 
the complainant (his marital status and his intentions for a serious relationship).  Consequently, one 
may doubt the significance of the racial aspect of this case.  At any rate, these aspects will not be 
discussed in this Essay. 
 6 Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 415 (Isr.). 
 7 CrimA 157/98 Eran Ben-Avraham v. State of Israel 456(6) PD (1998) (Isr.).  This case 
was preceded by two cases in which the accused was convicted of obtainment by deception.  In Al-
Shaabi, a married Druze presented himself as a single Jewish man and promised to marry a minor, 
who became pregnant with his child.  CrimA 499/72 Al-Shaabi v. State of Israel 27(1) PD 602 
(1973) (Isr.).  In Danino, the accused presented himself as a divorcee, despite his being married 
with children.  CrimA 817/76 Michelle Danino v. State of Israel 31(3) PD 645 (1977) (Isr.).  Gur-
Arye criticizes the court’s ruling in Al-Shaabi.  In her view, while the offense of rape was not 
committed by the accused, he is guilty of impersonation (currently Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 441 
(Isr.), then Criminal Law Ordinance, 1936, § 374 (Isr.)), rather than of obtainment by deception, 
which only pertains to the obtainment of financial benefit.  See Miriam Gur-Arye, Impersonation 
of a Non-Existing Person—Is It Personation or Fraud?, 5 MISHPATIM 673, 673–74 (1974). 
 8 CrimC (Hi) 389/02 State of Israel v. Chen Alkoby, Dinim Mehozi, PM 2003(32) 663 
(2003) (Isr.).  For an extended discussion of this case, see Aeyal Gross, Impersonating Another: 
Gender-Related Impersonation and Defiance in Chen Alkoby’s Trial, in TRIALS ABOUT LOVE 365 
(Orna Ben-Naftali & Chana Nave eds., 2005).  Similarly to Gross, this Essay also refers to Alkoby 
in the masculine, so as to respect the manner in which Alkoby sees his sexual identity.  Id. at 366. 
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that only the offense of rape by deception and its derivatives must be used in such 
cases.
9
 
The Israeli approach to rape by deception is interesting and of relevance to 
other jurisdictions that grapple with the issue of rape by deception.  The Israeli 
approach is more extensive than that taken by many other jurisdictions.  Some 
European jurisdictions tend to avoid criminalizing deceptive sexual relations 
altogether.  In particular, using deception to obtain consent for sexual relations 
between mentally sound adults is not generally criminalized in Germany
10
 or 
Spain.
11
  Other jurisdictions acknowledge that consent can be vitiated by at least 
some types of deception, but limit the offense of rape by deception to specific types 
of deception, such as spousal impersonation or sexual intercourse under the guise of 
medical treatment.
12
  Explicit reference to spousal impersonation exists in sixteen 
U.S. jurisdictions,
13
 and such references also appear in the Model Penal Code.
14
  In 
England, the category of spousal impersonation was augmented over the years to 
include impersonating a partner who is not the woman’s legal husband,15 and then 
extended to “impersonating a person known personally to the complainant.”16  Italy 
too criminalizes deceptive sexual relations only when they involve impersonation.
17
 
By contrast, there are some jurisdictions in which the approach is much closer 
to that of Israel.  In Canada, the Supreme Court interpreted Parliament’s removal of 
 
 9 CrimA 2411/06 A v. State of Israel, Dinim Elyon 2008(59) PD 318, 318 (2008) (Isr.).  It 
has been a matter of controversy whether the determination in A, which was held to be a case of 
deception with respect to the perpetrator’s identity, is also applicable to deception with respect to 
the nature of the act.  See CrimA 5097/07 Meir Fahima v. State of Israel, Tak-Al 2009(4) PD 2328 
(2009) (Isr.); CrimA 9274/08 A v. State of Israel, Tak-Al 2009(4) PD 3866 (2009) (Isr.). 
 10 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], ch. 13, § 177 (Ger.), which criminalizes rape, 
is limited to coercion; abuse of persons who are incapable of resistance, id. at § 179, is limited to 
mental or physical incompetence; and in other sexual offenses, deception appears only in the 
offense of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, id. at § 181; see also THOMAS 
FISCHER, STRAFGESETZBUCH UND NEBENGESETZE 1158 (2008).  Interestingly, Germany used to 
have a sexual offense that criminalized deceiving a woman into believing that the intercourse was 
within marriage.  STGB, ch. 13, § 179.  However, it seems that only one person was ever convicted 
of this offense, Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1966, at 1524–
25, and it was abolished in 1969 due to practical irrelevance.  8 GERMANY (WEST). GROSSE 
STRAFRECHTSKOMMISSION, NIEDERSCHRIFTEN ÜBER DIE SITZUNGEN DER GROßEN 
STRAFRECHTSKOMMISSION: 76. BIS 90. SITZUNG. BESONDERER TEIL 184–85(BAD FEILNBACH: 
SCHMIDT PERIODICALS 1991). 
 11 Deception is criminalized only when used in the context of trafficking, CÓDIGO PENAL 
[C.P.], art. 177(1) bis (Spain), prostitution, id. art. 188, or when the victim is between the ages of 
thirteen and sixteen, id. art. 182. 
 12 For cases in which impersonators under the guise of medical treatment were convicted of 
rape, see People v. Minkowski, 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 
96 (1884); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986). 
 13 Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud 
as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 99–100, 122 n.270 (2007). 
 14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  For an Australian case, see 
Papadimitropoulos v. The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249, 257–59 (Austl.). 
 15 See R. v. Elbekkay [1994] AC 163 (Eng.). 
 16 Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42, § 76(2)(b) (UK). 
 17 CODICE PENALE [C.p.], art. 519(4) (It.). 
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the words “false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the 
act” as an “intention to move away from the unreasonably strict common law 
approach to the vitiation of consent by fraud.”18  Tennessee applies the offense of 
rape to cases of deception without mentioning any specific form of deception.
19
  
Massachusetts considered a new bill that would impose life imprisonment for “rape 
by fraud,” which the bill defined as sexual intercourse to which consent was obtained 
“by the use of fraud, concealment or artifice.”20 
The Israeli experience sheds light on why some jurisdictions are reluctant to 
broaden the offense of rape by deception, offers a point of reference for jurisdictions 
that consider such a move, and is particularly relevant to the jurisdictions in which 
the offense is already broad.  This is because in Israel the offense of rape by 
deception has been broadened in a gradual and casuistic process, thereby producing 
detailed jurisprudence on the question of which characteristics can constitute 
deception. 
The purpose of this Essay is both descriptive and normative.  On the descriptive 
level, this Essay details the Israeli jurisprudence and scholarly opinions on the issue 
of rape by deception in a way accessible to non-Hebrew readers, and briefly 
compares it with approaches taken elsewhere.  On the normative level, the Essay 
seeks to show that the various attempts to answer the question of which 
characteristics can constitute deception all fail.  In particular, it seeks to show that 
the Israeli approach is the least attractive, a conclusion that, it is hoped, may serve 
as a warning to reformers in other jurisdictions who consider going in a similar 
direction to that taken by Israeli criminal law. 
It should be noted that the scope of the offense of rape by deception has at least 
two dimensions.  This Essay only discusses the content of the deception: deception 
as to which characteristics should be criminalized.  The other dimension, not 
addressed in this Essay, is the form of deception: what conduct amounts to deception.  
In particular, this Essay does not discuss whether omitting information regarding 
relevant characteristics amounts to criminal deception, what presumptions should be 
made about the parties’ mental states, what duties to disclose or inquire each party 
should comply with, or whether these questions should be assessed against 
subjective or objective standards. 
I.     THE ISRAELI APPROACH TO RAPE BY DECEPTION 
The offense of rape by deception with respect to the perpetrator’s identity is 
defined in the first part of section 345(a)(2) of the Israeli Penal Law, where the 
element of consent obtained by deception consists of two components.
21
   
 
 18 R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] S.C.R. 371, 380–81 (Can.).  For a similar statement, see id. at 424 
(Cory, J., dissenting) (discussing whether the failure to disclose HIV infection vitiates consent).  In 
Canada, offenses such as rape and sexual assault were removed from the Sexual Offenses chapter 
and integrated in a general graded offense of sexual assault under the Assaults section of the 
Criminal Code.  See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, §§ 271–73. 
 19 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (West 2017). 
 20 H.B. 3154, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2011). 
 21 See Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 345(a)(2) (Isr.).  Consent obtained by deception is part of 
the circumstance defined as “with the woman’s consent, which was obtained by deceit in respect 
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The first component is the presence of actual consent to the course of action 
proposed by the perpetrator, consent which was specific rather than general and, 
crucially, matched the misrepresentations made by the perpetrator.  If these 
representations were real, the case would be neither a deception nor an offense.  In 
Kashur, for example, the complainant agreed to have intercourse with a person who 
was similar to Kashur in all other respects, to the exclusion of his being Jewish, 
single, and interested in a significant, romantic relationship.  In Ben Avraham, there 
was actual consent to sexual relations with a person similar to Ben Avraham in most 
respects other than his being an ex-pilot, a practicing physician, and a wealthy 
village proprietor.  The second component is the hypothetical refusal to the course 
of action proposed by the perpetrator.  Had the victim known the truth, she would 
have refused to engage in that activity.  Following the event, both the complainants 
in Kashur and Ben Avraham claimed that they would not have consented to sexual 
relations with the accused had they known his identity. 
An important question, which is not settled by the Israeli legislation, relates to 
the characteristics that can constitute deception with respect to the perpetrator’s 
identity: Is every characteristic considered by the complainant critical in arriving at 
her decision, or is it only a characteristic that the court accepts as a reasonable basis 
for making such a decision?  In other words, is the proper standard for viewing this 
question objective or subjective?  Are the characteristics most important to the 
complainant herself to be considered, or should the court address only the 
characteristics considered critical by “a reasonable person” (or the characteristics 
that “a reasonable person” would consider important for the specific complainant)?  
Under the first, subjective approach, the characteristics considered by the 
complainant to decide what she considers critical to deception are entirely subject to 
her discretion, irrespective of the court, society, or anyone else deeming them 
marginal or whimsical.  Under the second, objective approach, deception as to some 
characteristics will be ignored even if the complainant reliably testifies that she 
would not have consented to the sexual relations had she known the truth about them. 
Under current Israeli caselaw, the standard for evaluating the importance of the 
deceptive characteristics is objective.  The most salient representative of the 
objective approach is Justice Rubinstein, who made this approach a binding 
precedent in Saliman v. State of Israel, and formulated the standard for deception: 
“[A] man not telling the truth in regard to characteristics critical in the eyes of a 
reasonable woman, and, as a result of this false representation, the woman had 
engaged in sexual intercourse with him.”22  Rubinstein does not specify the 
 
of the identity of the person or the nature of the act.”  Id.  The prosecution must also prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the accused was aware of this circumstance.  The proof of mens rea is 
discussed in Part IV.  A detailed analysis of the concept of consent obtained by deception can be 
found in Amit Pundik, Coercion and Deception in Sexual Relations, 28 CAN. J.L. JURIS. 97, 101–
08 (2015). 
 22 CrimA 2411/06 Saliman v. State of Israel, Dinim Elyon 2008(59) PD 318, § 105 (2008) 
(Isr.) (quotations from this case were translated to English by the author of this Essay).  The nature 
of the objective element in Rubinstein’s test is unclear because in the same paragraph he deploys 
another test using a different objective element: “[W]ould a reasonable person believe that this 
woman would engage in intercourse with this man were he not to present the ‘identity’ he had 
fabricated?”  Id. § 106 (emphasis added).  This test is considered in Justice Rubinstein’s judgment 
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characteristics that a reasonable woman would consider critical to her decision 
whether to engage in sexual relations, but rather leaves this as an open question that 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
23
 
The immediate problem with Rubinstein’s approach, as with the objective 
approach in general, is the interference with the woman’s liberty to determine what 
characteristics she considers important in her partner.  This approach does not 
protect any choice a woman makes with regard to the identity of her partner, but 
rather only those choices considered by the court to be reasonable.  This is true even 
when, before consenting, the woman makes it absolutely clear that she will not 
consent to sleep with the deceiver if he does not possess a certain characteristic she 
deems crucial (but the court deems unreasonable).  It becomes clear that such an 
approach is unacceptable once it is compared with the approach to cases of coercive 
sexual relations.  When a woman’s refusal is followed by coercive sexual relations, 
the court would never acquit the coercer of rape on the basis that the characteristics 
that led the woman to refuse in the first place are unreasonable.  Why, then, should 
the court interfere with the woman’s right to choose what characteristics she 
considers critical when dealing with deception cases? 
In addition to this general difficulty, Rubinstein’s approach aggravates two 
familiar problems with the use of open-ended standards in criminal law.  It is not 
difficult to guess why Justice Rubinstein opted to leave the question open, as 
compiling a comprehensive list of characteristics protected under the rape by 
deception offense would be a difficult, possibly insurmountable, task, given the 
complexity of the situations concerned.  However, in spite of the practical benefits 
engrained in Justice Rubinstein’s flexible approach, it is difficult to see how this 
approach might be reconciled with the principle of legality.  An accused might 
discover whether specific characteristics falsely presented by him resulted in his 
guilt only after the incident had occurred, and after a judicial resolution had been 
given concerning his case.  The principle of legality necessitates, inter alia, that the 
individual be warned prior to their punishment and firmly objects to retroactive 
punishment due to the violation of a behavioral norm not clearly designated as 
prohibited at the time of the individual’s behavior.  Rubinstein’s objective method 
might, then, bring about unjust punishment, sullied with retroactivity and not 
preceded by adequate warning.  This, of course, is a general problem that pertains to 
any use by criminal law of open-ended standards, but leaving this list completely 
open without determining any guidelines only elevates the threat that Rubinstein’s 
objective approach poses to the principle of legality. 
In addition to the principle of legality, Rubinstein’s flexible method may also 
adversely affect the efficacy of the criminal law in guiding behavior.  When it is 
unclear which characteristics ought to be disclosed, some men might fail to disclose 
crucial information based on their mistaken belief that that characteristic is not 
something a reasonable woman would consider crucial to her decision, undermining 
 
to be identical with the previous one, although these two differ substantially: while the first 
examines what a “reasonable party” would consider to be characteristics critical to her own 
decision, the second takes the viewpoint of a “reasonable bystander” and asks what characteristics 
such a bystander would believe to be critical in the eyes of the actual woman. 
 23 Id. § 107. 
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the deterrence created by the criminal offense.  Other men might be chilled and 
become overcautious, disclosing too much information in a mistaken belief that a 
reasonable woman would want to know.  This could present problems in finding 
potential partners and could prevent what would otherwise be mutually desired 
sexual relations.  As the list of reasonable characteristics (as perceived by the court) 
becomes increasingly vague and subject to the discretion of each judge, the risk of 
insufficiently or excessively deterring men and exacerbating the violation of the 
principle of legality grows. 
Of all the objective approaches, Rubinstein’s approach most acutely intensifies 
these problems.  His acknowledging the futility of trying to compose a list of 
reasonable characteristics not only leaves the list entirely open, it also directs the 
lower courts to determine what characteristics are reasonable casuistically and in 
accordance with the circumstances of each case.  While guiding behavior with open-
ended standards is challenging, such standards can sometimes be made more 
effective by setting some concrete precedents as to how the open-ended standard 
should work in practice.  However, in acknowledging that cases of deception are too 
complex and subtle to be analyzed with a predetermined list of reasonable 
characteristics, Rubinstein’s approach means that each case ought to be determined 
on its own merits, making the setting of guiding precedents all but impossible. 
Another objective approach might be found in English law and some U.S. 
jurisdictions,
24
 according to which rape by deception is restricted only to cases in 
which a man pretends to be a person with whom the complainant is personally 
acquainted.  This approach preserves the significance ascribed to paradigmatic cases 
of a man’s inveigling his way into a woman’s bed while pretending to be her 
husband, cases of key importance for the offense of rape from a historical 
perspective.  The historical purpose of this construction was to protect women from 
being found guilty of adultery according to religious law, which explains why the 
category was narrowly construed.
25
  However, while this approach avoids the 
problems of uncertainty plaguing Justice Rubinstein’s flexible approach, it is 
nevertheless not any easier to justify.  It is unclear why a woman should be free to 
decide to refrain from engaging in sexual relations with a man who pretends to be 
someone she knows but not with a man who pretends to be something he is not.  
Since the common law takes women’s actual refusal on grounds other than 
impersonation very seriously in cases of coercive sexual relations, why should it turn 
a blind eye to women’s hypothetical refusal on the same grounds?  And if the 
 
 24 In English law, for example, the test is defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42 
§ 76(2)(b) (Eng.): “[T]he defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant 
act by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant.”  For the U.S. jurisdictions, 
see Christopher & Christopher, supra note 13, at 76–77. 
 25 Dana Pugach, Criminalization of Conventional Courtship Practices? Deception, Victim 
Error and Consent in Respect to Sexual Offenses, in TRENDS IN CRIMINAL LAW 168 (Eli Lederman 
et al. eds., 2000).  Pugach also criticizes this approach by highlighting the conservative worldview 
on which it is based.  Id. at 168–76. 
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hypothetical refusal was not enough to justify a conviction of rape, why would it 
suffice in cases of impersonation?
26
 
Lastly, Aeyal Gross, who predicted Kashur long before it occurred,
27
 proposes 
another approach, which is mainly subjective but incorporates objective elements.  
Gross concedes that the criteria must be subjective, and that women should be free 
to select which characteristics are important to them, but insists on excluding (1) 
racist preferences and (2) cases like Alkoby, where the accused did not perceive 
himself as an imposter at all but rather presented himself to the complainant in 
accordance with his sexual identity as viewed by himself.  In such cases, Gross 
suggests an objective standard: since such characteristics are unreasonable, a 
hypothetical refusal based on them should not be vindicated by the law.  However, 
the criticism made above also applies to his approach: Given that a woman could 
refuse to have sexual relations with someone on the basis that he is Arab, and that 
coercion in such a case would be nothing less than rape, why should her preferences 
be discarded when considering whether the case amounts to rape by deception?  
Either a woman should be allowed to refuse sexual relations based on these grounds 
(actually or hypothetically) or not. 
II.     THE SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 
The most notable advocate of the subjective approach in Israeli scholarship is 
Dana Pugach, who claimed in her criticism of Ben Avraham that the question of 
which characteristics vitiate consent should be left to the woman herself rather than 
to the court.  In her view, one must address each characteristic deemed relevant by 
the woman, even if such a characteristic is considered whimsical or improper by 
society.
28
  The subjective approach avoids the problems faced by the objective 
approaches: it does not violate the woman’s autonomy by ignoring characteristics 
that are crucial to her and would have not have been ignored in cases of coercion; it 
respects the principle of legality, for men are able to know what is required of them 
during the event (disclosing every characteristic that that specific woman deems 
crucial); and it preserves the efficacy of the criminal prohibition because the 
guidance given to men is relatively clear.  The subjective approach thus calls for a 
stricter protection of women’s autonomy, as it enables women freely to select those 
factors they deem most significant and relevant to their choices without subjecting 
them to any external criteria.  As such, the subjective approach combines liberal 
principles of nonintervention in individual choices, and certain feminist principles, 
namely those of promoting women’s autonomy and preventing its subjection to 
institutional criteria, which are often determined by men.  The subjective approach 
is hence principled and well established, and perhaps the most attractive position for 
anyone who holds that deceptive sexual relations should be criminalized. 
While the subjective approach avoids the problems faced by the objective 
approach, it comes at a notable price: applying the offense of rape even to cases in 
 
 26 For further criticism of the American and English approaches, see Jed Rubenfeld, The 
Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1395–98 
(2013). 
 27 Gross, supra note 8, at 389. 
 28 Pugach, supra note 25, at 183. 
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which the preference in question is morally problematic or whimsical.  Under the 
subjective approach, it would be possible to convict a man of rape by deception who 
concealed his ethnicity from a woman interested in a relationship only with a man 
of a different ethnicity,
29
 as well as a man who is five feet, eleven inches tall who 
misled a woman to believe that he was one inch taller and she, due to a personal 
quirk, would have refused to have sex with anyone shorter than six feet.  The 
subjective approach leads to the state implicitly endorsing the first woman’s 
prejudicial preference and allows the second woman to harness the criminal system 
to protect her whimsical preferences.  However, these consequences of the 
subjective approach are not as groundbreaking as some might think.  This is because 
in an equivalent case of coercion, if a woman had refused to have sex on morally 
problematic or whimsical grounds and was then coerced to do so against her will, it 
would still be a case of rape, her grounds for refusal notwithstanding. 
III.     THE PROBLEMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF RAPE BY DECEPTION 
The purpose of this Part is to show that, when taken to its full extension, the 
logic underlying the offense of rape by deception yields an extensive and intrusive 
interference with the intimate lives of many members of society.  According to this 
concern, both the subjective and objective approaches have the potential to 
significantly broaden the offense of rape and other sexual offenses to many types of 
case which should not be criminalized at all.  Since some feminists might suspect 
that this liberal concern masks the neglect of protecting women’s interests in the 
name of protecting individuals from societal interference, this Part also shows that 
criminalizing deceptive sexual relations might have problematic implications not 
only with respect to men but also women.  Instead of enhancing the protection of 
rights or autonomy of women as a disenfranchised group, it has the potential to 
subject women’s sexual behavior to societal scrutiny and severe penal punishments. 
Assume, for example, a woman discovers that her partner was once unfaithful 
a few years before, and she would not have consented to have sex with him had she 
known him to have been unfaithful.  Should each instance of sexual intercourse 
between the two since the event of betrayal be regarded as a case of rape by 
deception?  Arguably, each time they had sex during that period an offense of rape 
was committed, contrary to Section 345(a)(2), since these instances involved the 
woman’s consent deceptively obtained with respect to the perpetrator’s identity: he 
was not the faithful partner she took him to be.  Even if consent to sexual intercourse 
was given at the time of the event, this consent was given to a man with a 
characteristic critically different from his: namely, to a faithful partner.  Since it 
seems plausible that a reasonable woman would consider the fidelity of her partner 
critical to her decision whether to engage in sexual relations with him, both the 
objective and subjective approaches would deem such a partner a rapist. 
Notably, reversing the gender roles in this example is all too easy, even in 
jurisdictions in which the offense of rape applies only when the victim is a woman, 
because the betrayed man could resort to the same logic and accuse his partner of 
 
 29 Gross, supra note 8, at 388–89. 
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other sexual offenses, such as an indecent act.
30
  Under both approaches it would be 
difficult to justify why deceptive infidelity vitiates consent in the offense of rape but 
not in other sexual offenses.  While offenses such as an indecent act usually carry 
significantly lighter punishments than rape, the betrayed man could accuse his 
partner of committing a separate offense each time they had sexual relations to which 
he would not have consented had he known of her infidelity. 
The example of infidelity illustrates how extensive the offense of rape by 
deception could be: it extends the offense of rape in such a way that a vast number 
of people might be convicted as rapists.  While the incidence of spousal infidelity is 
difficult to estimate and depends on different variables (e.g., gender, age, location), 
some statistical data indicate that it is over twenty percent.
31
  The exact proportion 
of individuals to be regarded as guilty of rape by deception varies according to the 
type of deception required (e.g., omission or commission), but in any event it would 
amount to a substantial proportion of the population. 
Moreover, the offense of rape by deception might surreptitiously introduce an 
offense similar in nature to that of adultery, since such an offense would allow 
individuals who had experienced infidelity to enlist society to impose severe penal 
sanctions on their unfaithful partners.  True, such an offense would not be entirely 
identical with that of adultery, as it would be both narrower and broader than 
adultery.  It would be narrower because adultery would also be invoked when both 
partners consent to an open relationship, whereas this offense would only apply if 
the betrayed partner was unaware of the infidelity and would not have consented to 
sexual intercourse were they aware of it.  It would be broader because, while adultery 
only applies to married couples, the offense of rape by deception might apply also 
to unmarried couples, and even to individuals who are not involved in a long-term 
relationship (if their partner would have refused the sexual relations had they known 
of the infidelity).  Nevertheless, applying the offense of rape by deception to 
unfaithful partners enforces a very conservative worldview of the boundaries of 
criminal law and of its authority over situations which are at the very heart of 
citizens’ personal lives.  The offense of rape by deception, with its potential for 
extensive and intrusive interference with the intimate lives of many members of 
society, is troubling from a liberal standpoint and might undermine the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice system. 
Another example of the way the logic of rape by deception may jeopardize 
women as well is that it would allow criminalizing “sperm theft.”  If a woman 
 
 30 In Israel, for example, he could resort to section 348 of the Penal Law, which incorporates 
extensive portions of the offense of rape, including the circumstances of consent obtained by 
deception with respect to the perpetrator’s identity.  See Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 348 (Isr.).  In 
the case of same-sex partners, it would also be possible to convict them of even more severe 
offenses.  A female who is the unfaithful partner of another female could be convicted of rape by 
deception, as the victim of the offense is a woman.  A male who is the unfaithful partner of another 
man could be convicted of sodomy, see id. at § 347, which also incorporates the circumstances of 
deception from the offense of rape, and can be punished as if he were convicted of rape, see id. at 
§ 347(b). 
 31 Michael W. Wiederman, Extramarital Sex: Prevalence and Correlates in a National 
Survey, 34 J. SEX RES. 167, 171 (1997) (finding that 22.7% of men had engaged in extramarital 
sex). 
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deceives her male partner about the use of or need for contraceptives and her actual 
partner (per the subjective approach) or a reasonable man (per the objective 
approach) would not have consented to the sexual relations had he known the truth, 
that woman should be convicted of a sexual offense, such as an indecent act.  
Consider the analogical case of Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, who was 
indicted for rape after deceiving his partner about his use of a condom.
32
  When 
ruling on the Swedish extradition request, the High Court of Justice in the United 
Kingdom decided that deception as to the use of protection can suffice to vitiate 
consent and transform Assange’s alleged actions into rape.33  Just as deception as to 
the use of contraceptives can vitiate the consent of a woman, it can also vitiate the 
consent of a man.  The consent in cases of deception about contraceptives was given 
to a person with characteristics differing from those of the deceiver (for example, a 
person using contraceptives), or was given only for sexual relations of a specific 
kind (protected sex).  While there is little doubt that the conduct of such a deceiver 
is impermissible, it is difficult to accept that she is a sex offender. 
The last example of the far-reaching consequences of the logic of rape by 
deception is that of cases in which a person engages in sexual relations after being 
deceitful about their capacity to consent.  This logic yields the conclusion that when 
a minor engages with an adult in sexual relations after being deceitful about their 
true age, the minor is a sex offender.  Suppose that a man is accused of statutory rape 
after engaging in sexual relations with a female minor who is a day shy of being of 
the age of consent, and he claims in his defense that she lied to him about her age.  
If the court accepts his defense, it follows from the logic of rape by deception that it 
might be necessary to prosecute the minor herself for an indecent act.  This is 
because his defense seems to imply that had he known that she was yet a minor and 
incapable of giving valid consent, he would not have engaged in sexual relations 
with her.
34
  Furthermore, and even more counterintuitively, if a woman sleeps with 
a minor male after he deceives her about his real age, the logic of rape by deception 
requires that the minor be convicted of no less than rape.  The evidence about the 
adult’s hypothetical nonconsent might be measured against substantially different 
standards of proof, depending on whether it is the defense or prosecution that 
submits it, and this difference might prevent the minor’s conviction in some cases.  
However, the important point is that accepting the adult’s defense requires 
addressing the question of whether the minor, who is currently taken to be the victim 
in such a situation, is actually culpable of committing a sexual offense.  This is 
troubling because the deceived party is not necessarily the more vulnerable party.  
As a result, while the logic of rape by deception purports to enhance the protection 
of individuals from sexual transgression, the example of minors shows that this logic 
might quickly backfire and turn into victim blaming. 
 
 32 See Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Auth. [2012] UKSC 22 (appeal taken from Eng.); 
Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Auth. [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin). 
 33 Assange, [2011] EWHC 2849, [87]–[90] (Admin). 
 34 This is more straightforward under the objective approach, because it is hard to deny that 
a reasonable man would have refused to sleep with her had he known she was a minor. 
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IV.     THE UNIQUE DIFFICULTY IN PROVING RAPE BY DECEPTION 
While the risks of overextending the offense of rape by deception identified 
above were related to substantive criminal law, it is important to highlight an 
additional risk that arises from difficulties of proof.  In addition to the factual 
element (nonconsensual penetration), the offense of rape also requires proving mens 
rea, manifested in the accused’s awareness of the victim’s nonconsent.  This Part 
seeks to draw attention to difficulties of proof that are unique to the offense of rape 
by deception.  There is a risk that these difficulties could be overlooked by courts, 
thereby further extending the far-reaching applications of rape by deception. 
The discussion focuses on the difficulties of proving the subjective mens rea 
required for rape by deception because in many jurisdictions, including Israel,
35
 the 
offense of rape is committed only when the accused had subjective mens rea; 
namely, he (rather than a reasonable man) was aware of the victim’s nonconsent.  In 
some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom,
36
 the offense of rape includes “rape 
by negligence,”37 manifested in cases in which the accused believed that the victim 
consented but his belief was unreasonable.  However, cases of rape by deception do 
not seem to raise issues additional to those already raised by the notion of holding 
people culpable of rape by negligence. 
As previously stated, an important characteristic of deception cases is the 
complainant’s consent to the sexual relations during the event, though this consent 
is invalid due to the deception.  As a result, the prosecution cannot be expected to 
prove the factual claim that the complainant did not consent, because actual 
nonconsent is not part of the factual element of the offense of rape by deception.  
Rather, the prosecution should prove the hypothetical (or counterfactual) claim that 
the complainant would not have consented had she known the truth.  This 
hypothetical claim consists of two separate facts: (1) that the complainant ascribed 
to him or to the sexual act characteristics which were not true, and (2) that these 
characteristics were so important to her that she would have revoked her actual 
(invalid) consent had she known the truth about them.  As with any component of 
the factual element, the prosecution also has to prove the corresponding mental 
element.  More specifically, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused was aware of the false characteristics that the complainant ascribed 
to him or to the sexual act, and of the crucial importance that she attached to them. 
In Kashur, for example, the prosecution had to prove that the accused was 
aware that the complainant held false beliefs about him and ascribed to him false 
characteristics (namely, she believed him to be Jewish, single, and interested in a 
 
 35 Section 19 of the Israeli Penal Law clearly states that any offense which requires subjective 
mens rea is not constituted if the error was made in good faith, no matter how unreasonable it is.  
See Penal Law, 5737–1977, §§ 19–20 (Isr.). 
 36 For England and Wales, see Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42, §§ 1(1)(c), 75(1) (Eng.); for 
Scotland, see Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, (ASP 9) §§ 1(b), 16; for Northern Ireland, see 
The Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, §§ 5(c), 9(1). 
 37 “Rape by negligence” was introduced in part to prevent defenses of flatly unreasonable, 
albeit allegedly honest beliefs in consent, such as in the English case of DPP v. Morgan [1975] 
UKHL 3, [1976] AC 182 and the American case of People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975). 
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significant, romantic relationship).
38
  The prosecution also needed to prove that the 
accused was aware that, had the complainant known that he was a married Arab 
person with no significant romantic intentions, she would have changed her mind 
and refused to have sexual relations.
39
  In other words, the prosecution had to first 
prove the material fact of the hypothetical nonconsent (which is part of the factual 
element), according to which the complainant would indeed have refused, had she 
known the accused’s true characteristics.  In addition, the prosecution also needed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the mental element, namely that the accused was 
aware during the event itself that the complainant would have changed her mind had 
she known the truth.
40
  Since Kashur was convicted in a plea bargain, the prosecution 
did not have to prove these mental states and could instead rely on the accused’s 
confession.
41
  However, had the case proceeded to trial, these mental states would 
have comprised a part of those material facts which the prosecution would have had 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  Kashur could have defended himself, for 
example, by arguing that even if the complainant formed her belief on the basis of 
something he said or did, he was unaware of the inference she drew from his conduct 
to his ethnicity.
42
  In particular, he could have insisted that while he gave her an alias 
(Dudu, in this case), he was unaware of the inference she had drawn from his alias 
to his being Jewish.  Rather than intending to deceive her, he merely gave her his 
nickname.  While the complainant believed that this name was Jewish, the inference 
she made was far from trivial, and at any rate he was unaware of it.  Alternatively, 
if he was aware of the inference she drew, he could have claimed that he was 
nevertheless unaware of the crucial importance she attached to the outcome of the 
inference, namely his ethnicity.  Given that they only had a single short conversation, 
he did not realize that his being Arab would change her mind about having sex with 
him.  It could be argued that the very fact that he bothered to create the impression 
that he was Jewish shows that he was well aware that his ethnicity was crucial to her 
decision.  However, his conduct could be explained by referring to the known 
phenomenon of “passing,” according to which some minority group members in 
multicultural societies seek to pass as members of the majority for various reasons 
which have nothing to do with the complainant (e.g., fears of societal maltreatment 
or self-identity issues).
43
 
Proving that the accused was aware that the complainant would have refused 
to have sex with him had she known the truth about him involves difficulties of proof 
which are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those involved in proving 
rape by coercion.  This is because rape by deception requires proving the accused’s 
awareness of a hypothetical state of mind.  In rape by coercion, the prosecution has 
to prove the accused’s awareness of the complainant’s actual refusal to engage in 
sexual relations.  Whether consent and refusal are mental states, expressions, or 
 
 38 CrimC (Jer) 561/08 State of Israel v. Sabbar Kashur, PM 1996(123) (2010) (Isr.). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 For an overview of this phenomenon among Israeli Arabs, see Leora Bilsky, ‘Speaking 
Through the Mask’: Israeli Arabs and the Changing Faces of Israeli Citizenship, 1 MIDDLE E. L. 
GOVERNANCE 166, 170 n.11 (2009). 
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some combination of both is subject to deep controversy.
44
  If refusal is an 
expression, it means that the accused’s awareness of the complainant’s refusal could 
be proved or disproved by reference to this expression, rendering this proof similar 
to proof of awareness of other nonmental facts.  And even if (more plausibly) refusal 
is a mental state,
45
 it is likely to be accompanied by some external expressions which 
indicate the complainant’s state of mind to an external observer, including the 
accused (this is true even when the refusal is not accompanied by attempts at 
resistance or explicit verbal statements).
46
  Either way, while proving an accused 
person’s awareness of the complainant’s refusal could be immensely difficult in 
some cases, at least there are some external expressions to refer to. 
By contrast, in cases of rape by deception, hypothetical refusal is unlikely to 
consist of or be accompanied by clear expression.  True, there could be cases in 
which the complainant states clearly and explicitly her hypothetical refusal (e.g., “I 
would not have slept with you if you were Arab”).  However, such statements are 
uncommon since they involve discussing hypothetical scenarios of refusal during 
the process of consenting.  This is particularly relevant to the intimate context of 
sexual relations, in which both partners tend to use subtle signals rather than clear 
verbal messages.  Normally the complainant’s hypothetical refusal is not expressed 
at all, rendering the accused’s awareness that she would have refused sex had she 
known the truth much harder to prove than his awareness of her actual refusal in 
cases of rape by coercion.  Furthermore, in cases of rape by deception, the 
prosecution still needs to prove the accused’s awareness of the complainant’s actual 
mental state: her false beliefs about him.  Rape by deception is thus subject to similar 
difficulties of proving awareness of actual mental state which are common in rape 
by coercion, in addition to the difficulties of proving one person’s awareness of 
another’s hypothetical mental state, which are unique to rape by deception.  These 
difficulties exacerbate the fear that the logic of rape by deception might bring about 
an inflation in the number of sexual offenders.  Not only might it dramatically 
overextend the scope of sexual offenses, these difficulties of proof might not be 
given their full weight, thereby allowing a conviction of rape by deception even 
when there is a reasonable doubt about the accused’s awareness of the complainant’s 
hypothetical refusal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has scrutinized the various approaches to the criminalization of the 
use of deceptive means in order to obtain the consent of a competent adult to sexual 
relations.  The least attractive approach seems to be that taken by the Israeli Supreme 
Court, according to which deception should be criminalized only when the 
characteristics are deemed important enough by the court, rather than by the 
complainant.  In addition to the arbitrariness of the protection such an approach 
provides to victims of deception, it violates the principle of legality and undercuts 
 
 44 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 144–52 (2003). 
 45 See generally Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL. 102 (2014). 
 46 As I have argued elsewhere, refusal may consist of (or be accompanied by) freezing, 
suffering, or some negative attitude toward the accused, all of which are overt and accessible to an 
external observer.  See Pundik, supra note 21, 112–13. 
186 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 93 
the efficacy of criminal law.  The British approach fares slightly better because the 
types of criminalized deception are clearly defined (e.g., impersonation to someone 
personally known to the complainant).  However, this approach is also arbitrary, 
since it is unclear why victims who were deceived about other characteristics which 
were crucial to their decision to engage in sexual relations should not receive similar 
protection.  The subjective approach avoids the problems faced by the Israeli and 
British approaches, but it might so broaden the field of sex offenses as to adversely 
affect both men and women.  Furthermore, rape by deception involves unique 
difficulties of proof, which might increase the risk of convicting the innocent.  The 
most attractive alternative seems to be the German approach, according to which 
using deceptive means to obtain consent to sexual relations is not criminalized at all.  
However, while such a minimalist approach avoids all the problems discussed in this 
Essay, it calls into question the criminalization of other forms of fraud, since it is 
difficult to accept that deceiving a person into giving some money should be a 
criminal offense, but deceiving her into giving consent to sexual relations should 
not. 
 
